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Abstract— NASA’s UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project 
concluded its second flight demonstration activity in late October 
2016. This activity demonstrated the capabilities and 
functionality incorporated into its Technical Capability Level 2 
(TCL 2) concept, which envisions future operations that are low 
density, capable of being performed over sparsely populated 
areas, and allow for a concurrent mix of longer duration, beyond 
visual-line-of-sight flights and shorter flights within visual-line-
of-sight (VLOS). To incorporate these features into a flight 
demonstration, a scenario-based approach was taken to address 
different aspects of the TCL 2 environment and to meet defined 
objectives. This paper will describe elements of how the flight 
activity was conducted and present analyses regarding UTM 
operations, system messages, and alerting as they pertained to 
meeting the demonstration objectives and shedding light on 
research questions and lessons learned.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) provide operators with 
the ability to control an aircraft from a remote location or 
provide strategic guidance when the vehicle is operating 
autonomously. These systems have a wide range of 
applications, and their affordability make them an attractive 
alternative to employing manned aircraft for similar missions. 
With their growing popularity, sales of all sizes and types of 
UAS in the United States is expected to grow from 2.5 million 
in 2016 to 7 million units in 2020 [1]. Based on current 
projections, the potential UAS fleet size will exceed that of 
manned aircraft by 35 times in 2020 [2]. NASA's efforts in 
developing the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) concept and 
ecosystem offers initial guidance for accommodating the 
projected demand. 
The primary purpose behind NASA's UTM is to safely 
enable the large-scale commercial application of small UAS 
(sUAS) (less than 55 pounds) in low altitude (below 500 ft) 
airspace [3, 4]. NASA's plan for research and testing of the 
UTM concept is a phased approach distinguished by four 
technical capability levels (TCL) outlined in Figure 1. Of the 
four, NASA has completed flight demonstrations for TCL 1 
and, more recently, TCL 2 [5]. 
 
Fig. 1. UTM Research Technical Capability Levels. 
The TCL 1 flight demonstration involved targeted testing 
of the UTM concept and early architecture. Test flights were 
conducted such that no more than 2 operations were 
concurrently active. These operations remained within singular 
3D volumes intended to encompass the flight path of the 
vehicle, which also required the aircraft remain within visual-
line-of-site (VLOS) throughout its flight. The UTM research 
platform checked for intersections between different volumes. 
When submissions were clear of conflicts, a notification was 
sent to the operator indicating that they were clear to proceed 
with their operation. However, if a conflict existed, a 
notification was sent that the submission was rejected. This 
process of de-conflicting airspace volumes served as an initial 
test of a safety layer intended to provide strategic separation at 
the planning stage. 
For the TCL 2 flight demonstration, the technical 
capabilities from TCL 1 were carried over and the concept was 
extended to include a mixture of VLOS and beyond visual-
line-of-sight (BVLOS) operations. Additional enhancements 
included alerting for airspace intrusion, alerts to contingency 
management, and segmented flight planning that allowed 
stratification of operational volumes and more efficient use of 
airspace during BVLOS operations. Conformance monitoring 
of flight positions and alerting was also a key component that 
addressed a more tactical layer of safety potentially necessary 
for enabling BVLOS and operations in close proximity.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190002007 2019-08-30T22:39:10+00:00Z
A scenario-based approach was taken to integrate the TCL 
2 enhancements and to design interactions that tested the 
concept, procedures, and technologies. An overall description 
of the TCL 2 demonstration and the results were presented in 
[5]. This paper will build upon [5] to provide a more detailed 
description of the demonstration and present results regarding 
the overall performance as well as an examination of the safety 
layers that were incorporated as part of the test.  
II. TCL 2 DEMONSTRATION BACKGROUND 
NASA’s UTM project has a well-developed 
simulations infrastructure and capability [6]. The many 
variations of operations, volumes, and associated messaging 
and procedures were developed and extensively tested in a 
laboratory setting through simulation. However, simulation 
does not adequately reflect the diversity of concerns and 
uncertainties that are inherent in the airspace and potentially 
impactful on operations. Such concerns are critical in gaining 
awareness and understanding of as the UTM research and 
development effort continues. Therefore, a live flight 
demonstration with industry partners from a broad segment of 
the trade space was planned and executed to observe TCL 2 
technologies and operations in a live environment. 
A. Test setting and participants 
The flight demonstration was conducted at the Reno-Stead 
Airport UAS test range in Reno, Nevada. A variety of 
technologies from industry were deployed at the test site to 
provide data and services in support of focus areas such as 
weather and surveillance. The UTM environment at the test 
range was internet-based and all of the clients developed by the 
test partners and NASA to perform and support UTM 
operations connected via wifi or cellular connections. The 
initial architecture for the TCL 2 research platform was 
centralized such that all of the UTM clients connected remotely 
to the core system that was housed at NASA Ames Research 
Center. Data was collected via the research platform, and 
interfaces developed for visualizations pulled from the 
database in real time in order to provide researchers and 
participants with the opportunity to monitor operations as they 
unfolded. 
Participants came primarily from industry, with a small 
complement of NASA flight crews. The participants were 
divided into three separate groups, each with three days 
dedicated to flight testing, which included setup and 
proficiency flights as well as the actual data collection runs. 
The flying partners brought a variety of vehicles to the test. 
Eleven unique vehicles were flown, each with different 
performance characteristics that needed to be accounted for in 
their planned flight profiles. Of those 11 vehicles, six were 
multi-rotors and five were fixed wing. For a more detailed 
presentation of the test range, vehicles, and partner 
technologies, refer to [5]. 
III. OBJECTIVES AND SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH 
A. Objectives 
In preparation for the flight test, a number of test 
objectives were formulated in accordance with the TCL 2 
construct. Each of the objectives was designed to address an 
important feature of the environment envisioned to encompass 
TCL 2 types of operations. The test objectives developed were 
as follows: 
 
• BVLOS operations (solo and simultaneous) 
• Altitude Stratified operations (VLOS and BVLOS) 
• Intruder aircraft tracking and alerting 
• Rogue aircraft alerting 
• Dynamic re-routing 
• Contingency management alerting 
• Public Safety operations 
 • Simulated aircraft   
B. Scenarios 
To address the test objectives, four scenarios were 
developed that consisted of a backstory and associated flights 
that would achieve the objectives if conducted properly. These 
scenarios were the drivers for the overall test points conducted 
during the demonstration. The first of these scenarios was 
referred to as the “Agriculture” scenario. This was considered 
to be a warm up scenario as the interactions and missions for 
each flight were somewhat simpler, yet fully tested a number 
of functions and met certain objectives. The idea behind this 
scenario leveraged the use case of small UAS being used in an 
agricultural and inspection setting in that some of the vehicles 
were performing flights in line with those that would be 
performed for crop inspections, railroad inspections, as well as 
inspections for other key infrastructure components in an 
agricultural setting.  
The second scenario was referred to as the “Lost Hiker” 
and involved a number of interactions. In this scenario, a 
number of different types of flights were conducted: cellphone 
tower inspection, sporting event and news coverage, traffic 
monitoring, and forest surveying. A simulated lost hiker was 
reported and a response ensued in which a nearby first 
responder reserved the airspace surrounding the location of the 
report through an in-flight plan modification and conducted a 
search operation. The airspace reservation resulted in 
notifications to nearby users to remain clear of the area and 
prevented others from accessing the airspace until the 
operation was complete.  
The third scenario, referred to as the “Ocean” scenario, 
involved maritime operations. These included oil rig 
inspections, marine wildlife monitoring, harbor surveillance, 
and fish and game enforcement operations. Similar to the “Lost 
Hiker,” the need for a water rescue was reported with resulting 
response.  
The final scenario that was developed was referred to as the 
“Earthquake” scenario. This scenario involved all flights 
initially performing various operations (e.g., terrain mapping, 
supply delivery, inspections) until a simulated earthquake 
occurred. Following the report of the earthquake, all flights 
were re-purposed to provide disaster response. This required 
each flight to submit in-flight plan modifications and begin 
new operations accordingly as part of the response effort. 
Incorporated into each of these scenarios were additional 
features designed to more fully address the test objectives and 
exercise UTM functionalities. Figure 2 presents visuals for 
each of the scenarios where it can be seen that the profiles that 
were developed included a mix of LOS and BVLOS 
operations, altitude stratified operations, as well as scripted 
situations that required in-flight modification. Priority 
operations were also incorporated into the scenarios as well as 
intruder aircraft for surveillance tracking. The flight profiles 
that were developed for each of the operations were designed 
to prompt interactions between operations, which would also 
trigger automated messaging and other data exchanges.  
Fig. 2. Four scenarios developed for UTM interactions in a TCL 2 
environment 
IV. PROCEDURE 
The TCL 2 flight demonstration was divided into three, 
three-day sessions with different groups of flying partners 
participating in each session. The format for each session was 
designed such that the first day was setup, equipment checks, 
and ground testing at the range. The second day involved 
safety briefings and proficiency flights early in the flight 
window. Test card data collection flights were commenced if 
the proficiency flights were adequately completed and any 
issues were corrected if necessary. The proficiency flights 
included a mix of simple VLOS and BVLOS operations that 
were designed to provide flight crews with familiarization in 
submitting flight volumes and flying their vehicles within its 
bounds. Proficiency flight volumes were simple and provided 
operators with room in which to put their vehicles through a 
number of checks and to ensure the data exchanges with the 
UTM research platform were correct and properly handled. 
VLOS proficiency flights were conducted with multiple 
simultaneous flights and BVLOS proficiency flights were 
performed one operation at a time for range safety. The third 
and final day was typically devoted entirely to data collection 
runs where different scenarios were performed in succession. 
The available flight windows each day influenced how many 
test cards were able to be completed.  
At the conclusion of each flight day, all of the individuals 
involved in the day’s events gathered for a debrief and 
discussion.  Participants were provided an opportunity to 
discuss issues that were of relevance to the test and the other 
partners and researchers as well. At the conclusion of the 
debrief, human factors researchers that served as observers 
(HF-O) were given time to hold separate debrief discussions 
that were focused on the flight test with respect to the UTM 
concept and the partners’ experience in that context. 
A. Roles and Architecture 
Flight crews differed in their size, having between two and 
five. In five-person teams, each person had a distinct role, 
while in two-person teams the members worked combined 
roles. The most common crew size was four people. In 
addition to the flight crew, there was an Observer Controller 
(OC) at each ground control station (GCS) that was always in 
contact with Visual Observers (VO) and the Mission Manager 
(MM) via radio. The OC relayed critical information from the 
MM to the flight crew and VOs to ensure operations were 
coordinated on the range. During prior testing it was found 
that the flight crews needed better awareness of their role in a 
UTM environment. As a result, a UTM representative 
(UTMrep) was embedded with each flight crew to provide that 
awareness through visualizations and verbal feedback on an 
individual flight’s performance as a UTM operation. Figure 3 
presents a layout of each team’s structure as well as the 
communication pathways.  
In the same way that there were a mix of team members 
and vehicle types, UTM clients that interfaced with the 
research platform also differed. Users brought eight different 
clients to the flight test. All of the clients were in various 
stages of development, so the numbers and types of functions 
and features varied accordingly. To participate in the 
demonstration, all clients had to have certain capabilities, 
including the ability to submit a flight volume request to the 
UTM system and to receive messages back from the UTM 
system. Beyond this, partner interaction and client interfaces 
to meet these functions were very different. During operations, 
the flight crew was primarily working with their own UTM 
client and interfaces. In general, UTM messages were 
provided to the flight crew by the partners’ clients. Certain 
configurations involved the UTMrep relaying UTM messages 
to the flight crew verbally. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Architecture and communications flow during the demonstration 
V. OPERATION VOLUMES AND GEOGRAPHIES 
According to projections, the density and complexity of 
sUAS operations in a future UTM environment will be quite 
high in certain segments of airspace (e.g., urban centers and 
surrounding areas). By necessity, therefore, the future system 
will rely on highly automated functions to monitor and manage 
operations in a safe, efficient, and effective manner. The 
traditional approach of air traffic management and control as it 
applies to manned aviation will not scale appropriately to the 
operational environments envisioned as part of UTM. 
A key operational component that enables airspace 
management and serves as the reference for the flight and 
conformance monitoring tested in the demonstration is the 
Operation Volume. An Operation Volume can be thought of as 
consisting of multiple Operational Geographies: Flight 
Geography, Conformance Geography, and Protected 
Geography (Fig. 4).  
The Flight Geography (denoted in green) is what the 
operator submits that defines the volume of airspace that the 
operation is intended to remain within, and the times in which 
the volume will be active. The Conformance Geography 
(denoted in blue) is a system-provided geography based on the 
submitted flight. The Conformance Geography is typically 
greater in size to provide additional buffer and account for 
environmental or performance uncertainties. The Protected 
Geography (denoted in red) is an additional system-provided 
geography that encompasses the Conformance and Flight 
Geography volumes. The outer bounds of the Protected 
Geography map to the outer bounds of an Operation Volume. 
If a vehicle exceeds its Conformance Geography but remains 
within the area between the Conformance and Protected 
Geography, the operation will transition from an “Activated” 
state to “Non-Conforming.” The operator can take corrective 
actions to bring the vehicle back within the bounds of the 
Conformance Geography. However, if the vehicle remains 
within the area between the Conformance and Protected 
Geography for a length of time in excess of a pre-determined 
threshold, the operation will transition from a “Non-
Conforming” to a “Rogue” state. Additionally, if a vehicle 
breaches the Protected Geography, the operation will transition 
to a “Rogue” state and is not expected to be able to regain 
conformance. 
 
Fig. 4. Operational geographies and conformance monitoring 
 UTM operations are expected to provide continuous 
position updates of the vehicle throughout the entirety of the 
mission. Each update is compared against the different 
geographies in order to assess the appropriate state. Different 
messaging responses are triggered according to state 
transitions. A transition from an ‘Activated’ to ‘Non-
Conforming’ state will result in an automated message sent to 
the operator that the vehicle is no longer in conformance. This 
provides the operator with time to bring the vehicle back 
within the bounds of the conformance geography and return to 
an ‘Activated’ state. If an operation transitions to a ‘Rogue’ 
state, however, not only does the operator receive notification 
messages, but operators that have vehicles within a certain 
proximity of the ‘Rogue’ operation will receive automated 
messages providing notification and awareness of the 
situation. 
A distinction between what was developed and tested in 
TCL1 versus TCL 2 with regard to operation volumes is that 
in TCL 2, a single operation could have multi-segmented 
volumes, each with different geometric and temporal 
characteristics. The ability to segment the volumes of an 
individual operation, particularly for BVLOS operations, 
provided a means to explore the ways in which airspace can 
be managed efficiently-an enabler for higher densities of 
operations envisioned for future TCL environments. The 
ability to segment volumes also enabled altitude stratified 
operations where multiple flights could occupy the same 
lateral volumes of airspace but have safe vertical separation 
provided by stacked volumes. 
VI. RESULTS 
Upon completion of the overall TCL 2 Flight 
demonstration, there were a total of five data collection days 
of flight. During that time, all of the data exchanges between 
partners and the UTM research platform were recorded and 
stored in a database for post-test analyses. This section will 
present results of analyses that were performed at two levels 
of detail. The first presentation will focus on the high level 
descriptive results that relate to the overall performance of the 
flight demonstration. The second presentation will focus on 
more specific results as they relate to flight and operational 
performance in the context of operations in close proximity 
and the safety layers that enable them.  
A. Demonstration Results 
Across the nine days of the flight demonstration, there 
were a total of five days devoted specifically to flight data 
collection. Six days of data collection were originally planned 
(two days per each of the three participant groups), but one 
day was impacted by high winds that prevented any flights. 
The available window of flight time varied each day 
depending primarily on environmental conditions. Winds were 
constantly monitored and a determination was made as to 
when the wind speeds exceeded the safe thresholds for the 
vehicles to operate. The winds were typically too excessive by 
early afternoon. 
Given the available flight windows, a total of 10 full 
scenarios were completed. The Mission Manager, in 
coordination with the research team, decided which of the four 
available scenarios to perform on each of the flight days. Of 
the 10 data collection runs, the Ocean scenario was performed 
the most at five times followed by the Lost Hiker and 
Earthquake scenarios, which were completed twice each. The 
Agriculture scenario was conducted the least with one 
completion, which was expected because it was designed 
more to test proficiency than for full objective testing.  
Across the 10 completed scenarios, a preliminary analysis 
of the data provided the determination that there were 35 live 
test card flights performed as part of UTM across the three 
participant groups. Additional simulated flights were 
conducted as part of the test scenarios while interacting with 
the UTM research platform, but the analyses presented here 
were focused on the live flights only.  
In relation to the 35 test card flights, each flew for 
different durations depending on their mission and 
performance capabilities. When aggregated, these flights 
operated for a combined duration of 7.66 hours and 
accumulated 142.61 nautical miles (nm) of along-track 
distance flown within the UTM environment. The flights were 
staggered according to their mission/role within the scenarios, 
which resulted in varying numbers of concurrent operations. 
Figure 5 presents a visualization for each of the flight days, 
comprised of the 35 live test flights, in which active flight 
times were compressed into a continuous duration for a given 
day. The x-axis represents the time duration of the flights and 
the y-axis represents the number of concurrent operations that 
were observed during the times of flight. From this 
perspective, Figure 5 shows that the maximum number of live, 
concurrent operations during the test scenarios was four. It 
should be noted, however, that additional simulated flights 
operated within the UTM environment at the time to raise the 
number of concurrent operations to five during certain peak 
periods.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Aggregate time of flight across all days of data collection 
According to the flight profiles designed as part of each 
test scenario, a mix of distances and altitudes were covered in 
the course of performing the test missions. Figure 6 presents a 
scatter plot of the maximum lateral distance flown from 
launch (x-axis) and the maximum altitude flown (y-axis) for 
each of the test flights. From the plotted distances, it is evident 
that there was a mix of VLOS and BVLOS flights, with the 
furthest lateral distance reached relative to launch location 
during a BVLOS flight at 8350 ft (1.37 nm). The altitudes 
flown were typically between 200 and 500 ft above launch 
locations, and the maximum altitude reached during data 
collection was 5619 ft MSL. 
 
Fig. 6. Diversity of distances and altitudes in which test vehicles operated 
during the demonstration 
The test card scenarios were designed to meet a number 
of test objectives during the course of their completion. Each 
of the scenarios addressed a partially different, but not 
mutually exclusive, set of objectives. To illustrate an example 
of multiple objectives achieved during a single test scenario, 
Figure 7 presents a plot in Google Earth of the flight paths as 
reported into the UTM research platform for each test flight 
along with the associated protected geographies for reference 
with respect to conformance as observed during one of the 
Ocean scenario runs.  
Fig. 7. Plot of flight paths and volumes along with surveillance, illustrating 
how multiple objectives were achieved during a single Ocean scenario 
To deconstruct the operations shown in Figure 7, each of 
the flights from the different GCS launch locations were 
plotted in a different color. Beginning with GCS1 in yellow, 
this particular flight represents a case in which a simulated 
operation was performed alongside live flights all within the 
UTM test environment. In this case, the simulated flight 
breached its protected geography, which transitioned the 
operation to a ‘Rogue’ state. Upon this transition, automated 
messaging was triggered and sent to the GCS1 operator 
alerting to the ‘Rogue’ status. Notifications were also sent to 
the GCS2 operation (in blue) due to its proximity to the 
‘Rogue’ vehicle. The flight from GCS3 (in magenta) 
represents a multi-segmented BVLOS flight that is also 
altitude stratified with the flight from GCS5 (in green), which 
is also multi-segmented and BVLOS. Of note in this example 
is the fact that both flights experienced unscripted ‘Rogue’ 
statuses upon takeoff and landing at GCS5 and GCS3 
respectively. This scenario also involved an intruder flight 
operated from the GCS4 location that tested the surveillance 
interface between a fielded ground-based radar and the UTM 
research platform. The vehicle operated from GCS4 
intentionally did not submit any operational UTM information 
to the system, instead relying on the radar to detect and submit 
return signatures in the form of warning regions within UTM. 
The white boxes in Figure 7 represent a subset of the warning 
region data that was exchanged between the radar and the 
UTM research platform. These regions were visible on the 
available interface displays and triggered automated 
notification messages for operations within a prescribed 
distance such that the GCS3 and GCS5 operators were made 
aware of a nearby “intruder.” 
Throughout the course of data collection during the flight 
demonstration, all objectives were eventually met 
successfully. 
B. System Level Results 
The preceding results have focused on high level, 
scenario-based events in order to provide an overview of the 
demonstration and highlight the successful achievement of test 
objectives. The following results will narrow the focus to 
more specifically examine system level interactions of flights 
that were operating in close proximity. As the research 
progresses from TCL 2 to TCL 3 and beyond, the densities of 
operations are expected to increase. An understanding of the 
value that UTM provides in enabling the higher densities and 
more proximal interactions is important to gain if such 
applications are to be realized in the future. 
1) Closest Point of Approach 
As a means of working toward gaining that understanding, 
the closest point of approach (CPA) was computed for each 
pair of flights that operated simultaneously during a given 
scenario. The analysis was again performed in accordance 
with the 35 test card flights as the scope of data for 
comparison. For the calculation of CPAs, the reported position 
data -latitude, longitude, altitude- for each flight was first 
organized and sorted by timestamp. For each timestamp in 
each scenario in which there were multiple flights’ position 
data, the distance between each flight was calculated in turn. 
The minimum distance was updated for each pair of flights as 
all timestamps were processed such that the CPA between 
each flight was known by the end of the run’s processing. 
Figure 8 presents the results of the CPA analysis as a 
histogram of distances grouped in 200 ft increments. It should 
be noted that these results only include the unique distances 
associated with flight pairs and duplicate distances removed.  
 
Fig. 8. Histogram of measured closest point of approach between each flight 
pair per test scenario 
The data presented in Figure 8 shows that there was a 
wide range of CPA distances observed between flights during 
the demonstration. The largest distance between flights during 
a test scenario was 6,287 ft, which was between two multi-
rotor vehicles flown from the GCS2 and GCS4 locations in the 
Agriculture scenario. Conversely, the closest distance between 
flights was measured at 208 ft between two fixed wing aircraft 
performing altitude stratified operations as part of the Ocean 
scenario.  
Of the total number of vehicle pairings in which a CPA 
was computed, seven resulted in distances that were less than 
1,000 ft. Table 1 presents a description of those instances 
where it is shown that of the seven cases, five were completed 
entirely nominally without breaching any of the protected 
geographies. The concern, however, is if vehicles are brought 
into close proximity as a result of one or both exiting their 
protected geography and being in a ‘Rogue’ state at the time 
of encounter. 
TABLE I.  CASES OF VEHICLES APPROACHING WITHIN 1000 FT 
 
Two cases out of the seven that came within 1000 ft of 
each other involved one vehicle that had transitioned to a 
‘Rogue’ state at some point during its mission. The concern 
with these cases was whether the CPA between the aircraft 
pair occurred while the vehicle was outside of its volumes. To 
address this concern, the flight path, volume, and CPA data 
for each of the involved aircraft were plotted to determine the 
location of the CPA encounter relative to the reported ‘Rogue’ 
positions. Figure 9 presents the results of the plotting and 
analysis effort where it is shown that, in each case, the 
vehicles were in lateral conformance at the time of their CPA. 
The vehicles were in vertical conformance as well, but 
because the operations were separated laterally, the vertical 
separation was of a lesser concern. The first case in the left 
panel of Figure 9 shows that the ‘Rogue’ state occurred during 
the landing phase of the GCS5 aircraft (in green) as the 
vehicle exited the protected geography to the north (shown in 
red); the CPA location between the two vehicles was well 
clear of the area in which the GCS5 vehicle became ‘Rogue.’ 
The second case shown on the right panel of Figure 9 involved 
a scripted ‘Rogue’ encounter in which the GCS1 vehicle 
intentionally breached its protected geography and hovered for 
a prescribed time. Even though this was a scripted event, it 
was still of interest to determine the proximity of the aircraft 
while one was in a ‘Rogue’ state. As presented through the 
plot of data, the CPA encounter occurred well after the GCS1 
aircraft was in its ‘Rogue’ state. In fact, the CPA occurred as 
the GCS2 aircraft was passing the GCS1 aircraft while in its 
landing phase. 
Fig. 9. CPA assessments of aircraft pairs that involved ‘Rogue’ events 
2) Altitude Stratified Operations 
Through the checks of flight geography submissions and 
conformance monitoring while vehicles are in-flight, 
operations can be performed in close proximity. As shown in 
Table 1, the situations in which vehicles were closest were 
when they were altitude stratified. In a UTM environment, 
altitude stratified operations refer to operations in which the 
volumes of two or more aircraft overlap, and the flight paths 
of the aircraft provide the possibility of overlapping 
trajectories separated vertically. The performance of altitude 
stratified operations begins first with the submission of 
adequately separated flight volumes that account for added 
buffers. Figure 10 presents the stages in which such operations 
were conducted during the flight demonstration.  
 
Fig. 10. Example of flight volumes used in altitude stratified operations 
In the top panel of Figure 10, the actual volumes used in 
an iteration of the Ocean scenario are presented for the lower 
aircraft of an altitude stratified pair. The segmented volumes 
used are all clamped to the ground and capped at an altitude 
that will be clear of the upper aircraft’s volume. The bottom 
panel of Figure 10 shows the volumes (in blue) of the upper 
aircraft as positioned relative to the lower aircraft’s volumes. 
In this example, the initial volume of the upper aircraft allows 
for its takeoff and for it to reach an altitude that will clear the 
lower vehicle’s volumes. The remaining volume segments are 
overlaid above the lower aircraft’s acting as a shelf, which 
provides separation and freedom of movement within the 
airspace.   
3) Safety Layers 
In the TCL 2 environment as constructed in the flight 
demonstration, there were two primary layers of safety: 
segregation of operations and conformance monitoring. 
Segregation of operations was the first layer of safety where 
flight volumes submitted by operators were supplemented 
with additional conformance and protected geography buffers 
and subsequently checked against other operations in the 
system to ensure that there was no overlap. If an overlap was 
detected, the submitted operation was rejected. This sequence 
provided an initial measure of assurance that operations 
conducted within accepted volumes will be clear of other 
cooperative operations in the UTM environment.  
The second layer of safety that was in place was 
conformance monitoring. As a vehicle performs its mission as 
part of UTM, its position updates are continuously checked 
against the conformance and protected geographies of the 
operation. If positions are detected between the conformance 
and protected geographies, the state of the operation 
transitions to a ‘Non-conforming’ state and automated 
messages are sent to the operator’s client providing 
notification of the state change and an opportunity to take 
corrective measure to resume normal operations. Remaining in 
a ‘Non-conforming’ state for an excessive duration or 
continuing outside of the protected geography results in the 
operation transitioning to a ‘Rogue’ state. This state is treated 
with greater significance because it represents a loss of control 
or awareness that compromises the safety of operations. 
Automated messages are again sent to the operator prompting 
them to close operations, and nearby operators are also sent 
messages notifying them of a ‘Rogue’ operation in the area.  
An examination of the operations conducted during the 
flight demonstration that resulted in a reported ‘Rogue’ status 
yielded the results presented in Table 2. A total of 12 cases 
were recorded that were not scripted and did not involve 
simulated aircraft or ‘Rogue’ due to delayed position 
reporting. The cases presented can be categorized according to 
the way in which the operation became ‘Rogue,’ which maps 
to whether the vehicle breached its protected geography 
vertically or laterally.  
 
 
 
TABLE II.  SUMMARY OF NON-SCRIPTED ‘ROGUE’ EVENTS 
Frequency Non-scripted Rogue State 
Reasons 
Vehicle Type 
4 Vertical: Too High Fixed Wings 
Only 
1 Vertical: Too Low Fixed Wings 
Only 
7 Lateral 5 Fixed Wings/ 
2 Multi-rotors 
 Of the 12 recorded ‘Rogue’ events, five cases involved 
a vehicle breaching its protected geography in the vertical 
dimension. Of that five, four cases involved the vehicle 
proceeding too high above the geography and a single case in 
which the vehicle was too low relative to the protected 
geography. Flight path data was gathered for each of these 
cases and plotted in profile view as seen in Figure 11. The 
volumes in which the flight was intended to be within at a 
given time are represented as blue segments, and the relative 
position of the vehicle can be compared. For the cases in 
which the vehicle was high, three of the four appeared to 
occur shortly after takeoff, suggesting an issue with defining 
appropriate volumes for fixed wing aircraft to account for that 
phase of flight. The case in which the vehicle was too low 
again involved a fixed wing aircraft that breached its protected 
geographies as it transited from the takeoff volume segment to 
a segment that had a higher floor. 
Fig. 11. Profile view of Rogue instances when the vehicle was outside the 
vertical bounds of its volume (blue segments) 
A total of seven ‘Rogue’ cases were recorded in which a 
vehicle breached its protected geography laterally. An 
examination of those cases revealed that the two events 
involving multi-rotor aircraft appeared to be a result of 
incorrect flight geographies mistakenly submitted prior to 
takeoff. The remaining lateral ‘Rogue’ cases were attributed to 
fixed wing aircraft. A sample of these events is presented in 
Figure 12 where the points at which the vehicle breached the 
protected geography are highlighted with a red box. From this 
sample, one can see that although there are instances of the 
vehicle breaching the protected geography during the 
operational phase, most cases involved the fixed wing aircraft 
exiting the volume either during takeoff or landing. This issue 
was due to the fact that fixed wing aircraft have wind 
requirements to adhere to for safe takeoffs and landings, and 
the volumes that were developed for these flights were not 
able to account for the dynamic winds a priori. 
Fig. 12. Rogue instances where the vehicle was outside the lateral bounds of 
its volume 
C. Operator Feedback 
At the conclusion of each day of flight, the crews and 
operators that participated gathered for discussion with human 
factors researchers to review the day’s events and to discuss 
topics relevant to the UTM concept. With respect to the results 
presented thus far, feedback from these discussions will be 
presented with regard to experiences with ‘Rogue’ state and 
messaging, and situation awareness. 
1) ‘Rogue’ State and Messaging 
For the flight demonstration, the conformance monitoring 
and state assignments were key components of testing the 
concept and the research architecture. While it appears as 
though the detection and notifications of ‘Rogue’ instances 
was successful as evidenced from the scripted and non-
scripted events, the operators felt as though there would be 
benefit in providing levels of the ‘Rogue’ state that were more 
descriptive and helpful for the operators. The messaging 
would also help others in close proximity to have a better 
awareness and understanding of the situation. 
Suggestions from crews regarding possible levels of 
‘Rogue’ included: 
-Under Control (intentionally outside of its operation volumes 
and under operator control) 
-Under control- lost communications 
-Not under control- lost communications 
-Rogue due to lost communications with UTM (versus lost 
communications between GCS and vehicle) 
-Rogue due to GCS down 
An additional piece of feedback from the debrief 
discussions was the desire to be able to recover from a 
‘Rogue’ state, similar to how the ‘Non-conforming’ state is 
treated if known in advance. However, a valid argument 
against this is that operators are responsible for being able to 
account for their vehicle’s characteristics and developing 
operation volumes accordingly. 
 
2) Situation Awareness 
When the flight crew awareness of the operations in the 
surrounding airspace was low, they spent more time and effort 
checking their own operations and tried to mitigate their loss 
of awareness by vigilantly keeping visual contact with the 
vehicles. Perceived risk as seen in altitude stratified flights and 
BVLOS flights were also observed to increase vigilance 
among operators. A NASA-developed mobile application was 
especially helpful during flight operations in gaining 
necessary situation awareness particularly in altitude stratified 
scenarios and in cases where vehicles were operating in close 
proximity. Reportedly, the most relevant pieces of information 
for operators were the system state of their own operation and 
that of that of the altitude stratified operation. The mobile 
application also helped to build a mental picture of the 
surrounding traffic, which helped the operators gain an 
understanding of the surrounding airspace situation 
VII. DISCUSSION 
NASA, in close collaboration with industry partners and 
the Reno-Stead Airport UAS test range, successfully 
conducted a flight demonstration of the UTM TCL 2 concept. 
Four scenarios were developed to provide a realistic backdrop 
to the concept and as a basis for designing interactions 
between operations and the research platform. These 
interactions provided a means to address the defined test 
objectives, which included elements of the TCL 2 
environment such as BVLOS flights, altitude stratified 
operations, Rogue detection and messaging, intruder tracking 
and alerting, and public safety operations. Over the course of 
nine days, three separate groups of flying partners and service 
providers participated. A total of 35 live test card flights were 
conducted in the process of completing 10 full scenario 
iterations. The flights included a mix of multi-rotor and fixed-
wing vehicle types, which were supported by a wide range of 
GCS and UTM client capabilities and designs.  
Through the performance of the scenarios, all of the test 
objectives were successfully achieved. The test card flights 
covered a range of distances, altitudes, and durations flown, 
and were all conducted while connected to the UTM research 
platform and environment construct. One of the defining 
features of UTM operations conducted in this environment 
was the use of multi-segmented operation volumes and their 
potential application as an initial layer of safety. The multi-
segment aspect of the operation volumes allowed for testing 
an approach to more efficient airspace management and 
flexibility particularly with respect to BVLOS operations. The 
use of multi-segmented operations also enabled the 
performance of altitude stratified flights in which vehicles 
flew within volumes that overlapped laterally but were 
separated vertically.  
With respect to operation volumes being considered a 
safety layer, the acceptance of volume submissions for 
operations intended to be conducted in close proximity to one 
another (e.g., altitude stratified), provided a level of assurance 
and expectation that the operations are able to be performed 
safely. This assurance applies to the ability to perform 
BVLOS operations as well where the operation volumes 
encompass the intended flight path of the vehicle and provides 
a means to enable awareness of that operation to others in the 
airspace or to those preparing to enter. 
As evidenced by the observation of fixed-wing aircraft 
unexpectedly climbing in response to thermals reported in [3], 
and the cases of unscripted ‘Rogue’ instances reported here, 
operation volumes are not a guarantee of safety. An additional 
layer of safety in relation to operation volumes applied in this 
demonstration, though, was the conformance monitoring of 
each flight as it submitted position updates to the research 
platform. In the progression of each of the ‘Rogue’ cases, as 
the vehicle first breached its Conformance Geography, an 
automated notification message was sent to the operator 
informing them of the breach, with an associated state change  
to ‘Non-conforming.’ At this point the operator had a chance 
to step in and correct the situation, but there was often not 
enough time or awareness to prevent the breach of the 
protected geography and resulting ‘Rogue’ state. Operators 
received additional messaging upon transitioning to ‘Rogue,’ 
although there were suggestions provided through debrief 
discussions that the messaging would be more valuable if 
additional detailed information was provided.  
An examination of the non-scripted Rogue cases that 
occurred during the demonstration revealed that, aside from 
submission errors, the majority of cases occurred during the 
take-off or landing phase of an operation. It was also notable 
that these cases all involved a fixed-wing aircraft. From these 
results, it is clear that more consideration and assistance is 
needed in terms of designing operation volumes that can 
account for changing wind directions and vehicle 
characteristics.  
With operation volume de-confliction and conformance 
monitoring serving as safety layers within the tested UTM 
environment, there was a high level of confidence in designing 
interactions that covered a range of operations with varying 
levels of proximity. The two operations that resulted in the 
closest encounter -less than 500 ft- were altitude stratified 
where the vehicles overlapped almost directly as they crossed 
paths laterally but were separated vertically. Each of those 
operations was performed nominally, staying within their 
operation volumes for the entirety of flight. The two cases in 
which a ‘Rogue’ state was detected as a result of conformance 
monitoring and the vehicles had a CPA of less than 1000 ft 
were shown to trigger the correct messages to the correct 
operators in close proximity. Situation awareness via client 
applications was critical to providing operators with the ability 
to react appropriately with a contingency procedure should the 
need have arisen.  
As the research and environment of focus transitions from 
a low density TCL 2 environment to one with moderate 
density near people, additional or different safety layers will 
be required. Sense and Avoid technologies and the necessary 
communications mechanisms will likely come to the forefront 
in enabling the types of operations envisioned for TCL3 and 
beyond. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
NASA was able to successfully demonstrate complex UTM 
operations in a TCL 2 environment in collaboration with 
industry partners and the Reno-Stead Airport UAS test range. 
A scenario-based approach to the demonstration provided a 
relevant means through which the key elements and objectives 
of the test could be captured. Although issues were identified 
through the testing and feedback of test participants, the 
overall results were in line with the overall UTM objective of 
safely enabling large-scale UAS operations in low altitude 
airspace.  
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